Because I've been so behind, there's so much to cover! So let's dive in:
In today's Archives of Surgery, researchers from Seattle's Harborview Medical Center report that one simple addition to the routine of caring for trauma patients made a significant difference to the patients' likelihood of acquiring a hospital-associated infection: bathing them once a day with the antiseptic chlorhexidine (in an impregnated wipe). Patients who were bathed with the antiseptic wipe, compared with patients wiped down with an inert solution, had one-fourth the likelihood of developing a catheter-related bloodstream infection and one-third the likelihood of ventilator-associated MRSA pneumonia. Cite: Evans HL et al. Effect of Chlorhexidine Whole-Body Bathing on Hospital-Acquired Infections Among Trauma Patients. Arch Surg. 2010;145(3):240-246.
How important are hospital-acquired infections? Here's a piece of research from a few weeks ago that I sadly failed to blog at the time: Just two categories of HAIs, sepsis and pneumonia, account for 48,000 deaths and $8.1 billion in health care costs in a single year. Writing in the Archives of Internal Medicine, researchers from the nonprofit project Extending the Cure analyzed 69 million hospital-discharge records issued in 40 states between 1998 and 2006. Hospital charges and number of days that patients had to stay in the hospital were 40% higher because of those infections, many of which are caused by MRSA — and all of which are completely preventable. Cite: Eber, MR et al. Clinical and Economic Outcomes Attributable to Health care-Associated Sepsis and Pneumonia. Arch Intern Med. 2010; 170(4): 347-53.
What else could reduce the rate of MRSA infections? How about Vitamin D? South Carolina scientists analyze data from the NHANES (National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 2001-2004), a massive database overseen by the CDC, and find an association between low blood levels of Vit. D and the likelihood of MRSA colonization. More than 28% of the population is Vitamin D deficient. MRSA colonization is increasing in the US. Can giving Vit. D decrease MRSA carriage? More research needed. Cite: Matheson EM et al. Vitamin D and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus nasal carriage. Scand J Infect Dis. 2010 Mar 8. [Epub ahead of print]
And finally: Who else carries MRSA? Some unlucky pet owners have found that animals can harbor human strains, long enough at least to pass the strain back to a human whose colonization has been cleared. So it makes sense to ask whether humans who spend time with pets are carrying the bug. Last month's Veterinary Surgery reports that the answer is Yes. Veterinarians are carrying MRSA in very significant numbers: 17% of vets and 18% of vet technicians at an international veterinary symposium held in San Diego in 2008. Cite: Burstiner, LC et al. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Colonization in Personnel Attending a Veterinary Surgery Conference. Vet Surg. 2010 Feb;39(2):150-7.
Antibiotic resistance. The things we do to make it worse. And anything else I find interesting.
Showing posts with label medical errors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label medical errors. Show all posts
15 March 2010
02 February 2010
Recommending: Consumer Reports on hospital infections
Constant readers, the magazine Consumer Reports has done an extended, state-by-state analysis of which hospitals do well, or very badly, in preventing one important category of infections: central line-associated bloodstream infections, or CLABSIs (pronounced klab-sees). It's a comprehensive package in easily understandable language. It's based on the state reporting data that some activists have managed to persuade states to disclose, along with another set of data that some hospitals voluntarily tender to the nonprofit firm The Leapfrog Group.
From the Consumer Reports story:
From the Consumer Reports story:
Poorly performing hospitals included some major teaching institutions. For instance, New York University Langone Medical Center in New York City reported 39 infections in 10,119 central-line days in 2008, roughly twice the national average for its mix of ICUs. The University of Virginia Medical Center in Charlottesville didn't do much better, reporting 77 infections in 18,572 days for the 15 months ending in September 2009, also about two times the national average.
More encouragingly, nationwide, we counted 105 hospitals whose most recent public reports tallied zero central-line infections. They ranged from modest rural institutions to urban giants such as the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Presbyterian hospital, which reported no infections among patients who were on central lines a total of 13,596 days in 2008.It's well worth reading, and checking to see whether a hospital you may have used, or may be considering using, is on the good list or the bad list. Take a look.
10 December 2009
Bad news from California: MRSA quadrupled
Via the Fresno Business Journal and the Torrance Daily Breeze come reports of a new study by California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development: Known MRSA cases in the state's hospitals increased four-fold between 1999 and 2007, from 13,000 to 52,000 cases per year.
From the Torrance paper:
From the Torrance paper:
The good news is that the percentage of people who die of MRSA has decreased, from about 35 percent in 1999 to 24 percent in 2007. The raw number of deaths, however, more than doubled to about 12,500. (Byline: Melissa Evans)From the Fresno paper (no byline):
Fresno, Kings, Madera and Tulare counties were among 38 counties in California that had 61 to 80% of patients with staph infections.100%??
Only one county, Sierra, fared worse. Eight-one to 100% of patients ended up with staph infections in that county’s hospitals.
In 1999, Kings and Madera counties were in the 0 to 20% range and Fresno and Tulare counties were in the 21 to 40% range.
09 December 2009
My guest-post elsewhere: Bad news on hospital error rates
It's been 10 years since the publication of the pathbreaking Institute of Medicine report, "To Err is Human," which for the first time focused policy attention on medical errors. The Interdisciplinary Nursing Quality Research Initiative has been running a two-week special series of posts to mark the occasion, and they very kindly asked me to contribute.
Here's a link to my guest-post, "Hospital Error Rates — Still a Long Way To Go," looking at a recent paper and editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association that reported very discouraging results in rates of infections in ICUs worldwide. (And, umm, yes, that is what I look like.)
While you're there, please take a look also at another guest post by my good friend Nancy Shute, former staff writer and now blogger for US News & World Report, who discusses the difficulty of speaking up as a patient, based on her own experience in the hospital last summer. It's very worth a read.
Here's a link to my guest-post, "Hospital Error Rates — Still a Long Way To Go," looking at a recent paper and editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association that reported very discouraging results in rates of infections in ICUs worldwide. (And, umm, yes, that is what I look like.)
While you're there, please take a look also at another guest post by my good friend Nancy Shute, former staff writer and now blogger for US News & World Report, who discusses the difficulty of speaking up as a patient, based on her own experience in the hospital last summer. It's very worth a read.
13 August 2009
One more set of recommendations
... and then next week I'll be back to analyzing the medical literature: A stack of interesting new journal articles is threatening to topple and bury my computer.
For the moment, though:
First, the Hearst newspapers chain has conducted a nationwide investigation into medical errors that should be required reading for anyone who wonders why hospitals can't do a better job controlling hospital-acquired infections. It is a 7-part series focusing on the 5 states (New York, Texas, California, Connecticut, Washington) where there are Hearst papers, and hosted on the site of the San Francisco Chronicle. The introductory article says:
There is just one notable MRSA story in the mix, the death of a retired hospital president who contracted the bug in his own hospital. But they are all worth reading.
Second, an executive and apparently new writer named David Goldhill has written for The Atlantic a passionate and well-thought out piece on his father's death from a hospital-acquired infection and on what needs to change for such deaths to never happen again. "My survivor’s grief has taken the form of an obsession with our health-care system," he writes:
For the moment, though:
First, the Hearst newspapers chain has conducted a nationwide investigation into medical errors that should be required reading for anyone who wonders why hospitals can't do a better job controlling hospital-acquired infections. It is a 7-part series focusing on the 5 states (New York, Texas, California, Connecticut, Washington) where there are Hearst papers, and hosted on the site of the San Francisco Chronicle. The introductory article says:
Ten years ago, a highly publicized federal report called the death toll shocking and challenged the medical community to cut it in half — within five years.From that opening statement, the investigation goes on to explore many patient stories that individually are tragedies and collectively — as we here know all to well — are a scandal.
Instead, federal analysts believe the rate of medical error is actually increasing.
A national investigation by Hearst Newspapers found that the medical community, the federal government and most states have overwhelmingly failed to take the effective steps outlined in the report a decade ago.
... in five states served by Hearst newspapers — New York, California, Texas, Washington and Connecticut — only 20 percent of some 1,434 hospitals surveyed are participating in two national safety campaigns begun in recent years.
Also, a detailed safety analysis prepared for Hearst Newspapers examined discharge records from 1,832 medical facilities in four of those states. It found major deficiencies in patient data states collect from hospitals, yet still found that a minimum of 16 percent of hospitals had at least one death from common procedures gone awry — and some had more than a dozen. (Byline: Cathleen F. Crowley and Eric Nalder)
There is just one notable MRSA story in the mix, the death of a retired hospital president who contracted the bug in his own hospital. But they are all worth reading.
Second, an executive and apparently new writer named David Goldhill has written for The Atlantic a passionate and well-thought out piece on his father's death from a hospital-acquired infection and on what needs to change for such deaths to never happen again. "My survivor’s grief has taken the form of an obsession with our health-care system," he writes:
My dad became a statistic—merely one of the roughly 100,000 Americans whose deaths are caused or influenced by infections picked up in hospitals. One hundred thousand deaths: more than double the number of people killed in car crashes, five times the number killed in homicides, 20 times the total number of our armed forces killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another victim in a building American tragedy.You may not agree with his conclusions, but it is worth reading through to the end to experience how one intelligent citizen from outside health care understands and attempts to re-think our broken system.
09 June 2009
Infections rise, but hospital budgets - and infection control - shrink
Bad news from the Association of Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC): In a survey of almost 2,000 of their 12,000 members, 41% say that their hospitals' infection-prevention budgets have been cut due to the down economy.
According to the survey, conducted March 2009 and released Tuesday morning:
The full report is here.
According to the survey, conducted March 2009 and released Tuesday morning:
Three-quarters of those whose budgets were cut experienced decreases for the necessary education that trains healthcare personnel in preventing the transmission of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) such as MRSA and C. difficile.As we know here, there are (by CDC estimate) 1.7 million hospital-acquired infections and 99,000 deaths as a result of them, each year. These are numbers we are supposed to be trying to reduce. That is going to be less likely if less money flows toward what may already be an underfunded goal:
Half saw reductions in overall budgets for infection prevention, including money for technology, staff, education, products, equipment and updated resources.
Nearly 40 percent had layoffs or reduced hours, and a third experienced hiring freezes.
A third of survey respondents say that cuts in staffing and resources have reduced their capacity to focus on infection prevention activities.Disturbingly, at a time when electronic health records are such an important part of the health-reform debate, "Only one in five respondents have data-mining programs – electronic surveillance systems that allow infection preventionists to identify and investigate potential infections in real time." (APIC press release)
A quarter of respondents have had to reduce surveillance activities to detect, track and monitor HAIs.
The full report is here.
08 June 2009
10 years but little progress on patient safety
Constant readers, I've been away for a week — trying to get my breath back now that the chaos of the novel H1N1/swine flu is diminishing — and so I've missed a lot of news. Over this week, I'll try to catch you up on it.
First up: Some of you know that, 10 years ago, the nonpartisan, Congressionally-chartered Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a groundbreaking report called To Err is Human (html here, pdf here) that jump-started examination of medical quality in the United States. That report said:
And yet: Despite all that scrutiny and activism, we are nowhere near as far as we should be in reducing medical errors. Just in the area of hospital infections, which is our greatest interest here, there is not mandatory reporting in all states, and there is no nationwide reporting.
So says the Safe Patient Project of Consumers Union, which has produced an update to the IOM report called To Err is Human — To Delay is Deadly. They conclude:
First up: Some of you know that, 10 years ago, the nonpartisan, Congressionally-chartered Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a groundbreaking report called To Err is Human (html here, pdf here) that jump-started examination of medical quality in the United States. That report said:
Health care in the United States is not as safe as it should be--and can be. At least 44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors that could have been prevented...The report prompted a huge groundswell of legislative interest and patient advocacy that led, years later, to the successful passage of state laws insisting on public reporting of hospital infections and more recently on disclosure of hospital-acquired MRSA.
Preventable medical errors in hospitals exceed attributable deaths to such feared threats as motor-vehicle wrecks, breast cancer, and AIDS. ...
Beyond their cost in human lives, preventable medical errors exact other significant tolls. They have been estimated to result in total costs (including the expense of additional care necessitated by the errors, lost income and household productivity, and disability) of between $17 billion and $29 billion per year in hospitals nationwide. (To Err is Human, executive summary)
And yet: Despite all that scrutiny and activism, we are nowhere near as far as we should be in reducing medical errors. Just in the area of hospital infections, which is our greatest interest here, there is not mandatory reporting in all states, and there is no nationwide reporting.
So says the Safe Patient Project of Consumers Union, which has produced an update to the IOM report called To Err is Human — To Delay is Deadly. They conclude:
Ten years later, we don’t know if we’ve made any real progress, and efforts to reduce the harm caused by our medical care system are few and fragmented. With little transparency and no public reporting (except where hard fought state laws now require public reporting of hospital infections), scarce data does not paint a picture of real progress.The project finds that many of the reforms recommended by the IOM in 1999 have not been created:
Based on our review of the scant evidence, we believe that preventable medical harm still accounts for more than 100,000 deaths each year — a million lives over the past decade. This statistic by all logic is conservative. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that hospital-acquired infections alone kill 99,000 people each year.
- Few hospitals have adopted well-known systems to prevent medication errors and the FDA rarely intervenes.While the FDA reviews new drug names for potential confusion, it rarely requires name changes of existing drugs despite high levels of documented confusion among drugs, which can result in dangerous medication errors. Computerized prescribing and dispensing systems have not been widely adopted by hospitals or doctors, despite evidence that they make patients safer.
- A national system of accountability through transparency as recommended by the IOM has not been created. While 26 states now require public reporting of some hospital-acquired infections, the medical error reporting currently in place fails to create external pressure for change. In most cases hospital-specific information is confidential and under-reporting of errors is not curbed by systematic validation of the reported data.
- No national entity has been empowered to coordinate and track patient safety improvements.Ten years after To Err is Human, we have no national entity comprehensively tracking patient safety events or progress in reducing medical harm and we are unable to tell if we are any better off than we were a decade ago. While the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality attempts to monitor progress on patient safety, its efforts fall short of what is needed.
- Doctors and other health professionals are not expected to demonstrate competency.There has been some piecemeal action on patient safety by peers and purchasers, but there is no evidence that physicians, nurses, and other health care providers are any more competent in patient safety practices than they were ten years ago.
We give the country a failing grade on progress on select recommendations we believe necessary to create a health-care system free of preventable medical harm.
07 April 2009
How hospitals are like cockpits
We've talked a couple of times about the growing push for checklists in surgery and elsewhere in hospitals, promoted by Hopkins professor and MacArthur "genius" grant-winner Dr. Peter Provonost and modeled on the use of checklists in aviation. (This stuff interests me not just because it offers so much promise for MRSA reduction but because, as constant readers will remember, I am a pilot and am married to an avionics engineer.)
Provonost and colleagues have a very interesting piece in the current Health Affairs that takes another aviation concept — the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) — and applies it to medical errors. CAST is a public-private partnership from across the aviation spectrum — government, airlines, labor, manfacturers — that came together in the wake of several terrible accidents to do system-wide analyses of fail points. Provonost proposes that health care could vastly reduce errors by implementing a CAST model.
The cite is: Provonost, PJ, Goeschel CA, Olsen KL et al. Reducing Health Care Hazards: Lessons From The Commercial Aviation Safety Team. Health Affairs 28, no. 3 (2009): w479-w489 (published online 7 April 2009; 10.1377/hlthaff.28.3.w479)]
Provonost and colleagues have a very interesting piece in the current Health Affairs that takes another aviation concept — the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) — and applies it to medical errors. CAST is a public-private partnership from across the aviation spectrum — government, airlines, labor, manfacturers — that came together in the wake of several terrible accidents to do system-wide analyses of fail points. Provonost proposes that health care could vastly reduce errors by implementing a CAST model.
The cite is: Provonost, PJ, Goeschel CA, Olsen KL et al. Reducing Health Care Hazards: Lessons From The Commercial Aviation Safety Team. Health Affairs 28, no. 3 (2009): w479-w489 (published online 7 April 2009; 10.1377/hlthaff.28.3.w479)]
11 February 2009
An inside look at combating HAIs
I've been moving my RSS feeds over to a new reader and so am behind in reading things. That's my lame excuse for not noticing an excellent story in the Washington Post Tuesday, a first-person account tracing the "conversion" of one skeptical physician to the cause of reducing hospital infections.
The story was highlighted at the New Health Dialogue, a must-read health-reform blog, by my friend and former fellow Kaiser fellow, Joanne Kenen.
The story was highlighted at the New Health Dialogue, a must-read health-reform blog, by my friend and former fellow Kaiser fellow, Joanne Kenen.
HAI money in the stimulus bill
Constant readers, for those of you who are following the back-and-forth over the economic stimulus bill, I wanted to let you know that the Association of Professionals in Infection Control (APIC) is saying that the compromise may cut money for state programs to reduce hospital-associated infections.
Here is APIC's alert:
But if you are concerned about the recent new initiatives in various states to report, track and control HAIs, this is probably worth looking at.
Here is APIC's alert:
ACT NOW TO PRESERVE HAI AND PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING IN STIMULUS BILLI apologize that, being deep in book production, I don't know the details of the HAI-reduction programs they are talking about, whether it means support for new mandatory reporting programs or some other thing. (I'll ask some of the HAI-focused organizations to weigh in back-channel if they can.)
Your urgent action is needed now to preserve public health funding related to HAIs in the stimulus bill pending in Congress.
The stimulus bill passed by the House of Representatives includes $3 billion in funding for overall public health, prevention and wellness programs. Part of this funding includes $150 million for carrying out activities to implement a national action plan to prevent healthcare-associated infections, $50 million of which would be provided to states to implement HAI reduction strategies.
Because of the fast-moving action on this legislation, and the fact that an agreement has been reached to remove prevention and wellness from the Senate stimulus bill, your Members of Congress need to hear from you today as the House and Senate prepare to confer over a final version of the bill. We need them to support the House-passed provisions for public health, prevention and wellness and the HAI language in the stimulus bill (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).
But if you are concerned about the recent new initiatives in various states to report, track and control HAIs, this is probably worth looking at.
19 January 2009
US Air 1549 and the relevance of checklists
Constant readers, when we discussed the importance of surgical checklists last week, I mentioned parenthetically that I am a licensed pilot. (For av geeks: single engine, taildragger, VFR. And, just to complete the geekery, married to an avionics engineer.) So I've been particularly fascinated by the story and back-story of US Air flight 1549, which — as I am sure most of you know — bellied into the Hudson last week after losing both its engines to bird ingestion and landed beautifully, with no injuries to its passengers or crew.
The landing is being called a miracle, but to a pilot, it's no miracle: It's a testament to excellent performance under pressure by pilot-in-command Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger III and his first officer and crew. How did they perform so well? They ran down a checklist. Why did they reach for the checklist immediately, almost instinctively, and perform so well as a group? Because they trained many, many, many times to do exactly that.
Last week's New England Journal of Medicine article made clear the value of checklists to medicine. But patient-safety analyst Bob Wachter asks an additional vital question: Even when medicine has such measures, how often do we train to implement them? The answer, he finds, is not often:
The landing is being called a miracle, but to a pilot, it's no miracle: It's a testament to excellent performance under pressure by pilot-in-command Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger III and his first officer and crew. How did they perform so well? They ran down a checklist. Why did they reach for the checklist immediately, almost instinctively, and perform so well as a group? Because they trained many, many, many times to do exactly that.
Last week's New England Journal of Medicine article made clear the value of checklists to medicine. But patient-safety analyst Bob Wachter asks an additional vital question: Even when medicine has such measures, how often do we train to implement them? The answer, he finds, is not often:
We need to continue to work, as aviation has for the past generation, to train our "pilots" to become Sullys. Because we in healthcare are flying over some pretty cold rivers, each and every day.(Hat tip to KevinMD.com for calling attention to Wachter's post.)
14 January 2009
Reducing errors: Worldwide proof that it's not so hard
There's an encouraging joint announcement coming this afternoon from the World Health Organization and the New England Journal of Medicine. (I've set the timer on this post to publish when the embargo lifts.)
Using a simple but detailed checklist, eight hospitals in a mix of high-income and resource-poor areas were able to reduce their rates of surgical complications by one-third and their rate of death due to surgical complications by almost one-half.
The checklist study was sponsored by the WHO's Safe Surgery Saves Lives campaign. It was headed by surgeon and author Atul Gawande, MD, who is lead author of the NEJM paper and has spoken passionately about checklists as a simple, reliable, reproducible, low-cost intervention that can return extraordinary improvements.
The checklist idea originates in medicine with Dr. Peter Provonost, Johns Hopkins University critical-care researcher and MacArthur "genius" fellow. Gawande wrote a profile of Provonost, and plea for checklist implementation, in the New Yorker in Dec. 2007, and followed that article two weeks later with a New York Times op-ed piece.
The checklist idea has been borrowed from other tech-intensive fields, notably aviation. As a licensed pilot, I can testify that no pilot or crew, no matter how experienced, would ever dare take off without running through a checklist. To believe that you can keep everything you need to do in your head without reference to an external reminder is, in aviation, simply not a credible position. It is considered an absurd display of ego that puts others at unnecessary risk. (For a taste of how aviation looks at medicine's resistance to improvement, see Sir Richard Branson's comments last month.)
In the current study, one hospital in each of eight cities — Toronto, New Delhi, Amman, Auckland, Manila, London, Seattle and Ifakara, Tanzania — agreed to follow a pre-, during- and post-surgery checklist for every noncardiac surgery on patients older than 16. The study group collected data before implementation of the checklist on 3,733 consecutively enrolled patients, and during the checklist implementation, on 3,955 patients.
The checklist is on the WHO website (.pdf in English) along with toolkits for implementation. If you look, you'll see it is very simple. For instance, before anesthesia:
Now, the research team is careful to point out the possible confounders to this study: It introduced changes in systems at the hospitals that may have created independent effects. It may suffer from the Hawthorne effect ("Observation changes the behavior of the observed.") Given that it used consecutively enrolled patients, it may be affected by secular trends at the individual institutions. And it does not track complications post-discharge.
All that being said, I think we can take this as a very potent argument for the adoption of surgical checklists as a component of campaigns to reduce medical errors. And, as Gawande says in the press release that WHO put out this afternoon, a pointer to possible improvements in other specialties as well:
UPDATE: The full text has been placed online for free.
Using a simple but detailed checklist, eight hospitals in a mix of high-income and resource-poor areas were able to reduce their rates of surgical complications by one-third and their rate of death due to surgical complications by almost one-half.
The checklist study was sponsored by the WHO's Safe Surgery Saves Lives campaign. It was headed by surgeon and author Atul Gawande, MD, who is lead author of the NEJM paper and has spoken passionately about checklists as a simple, reliable, reproducible, low-cost intervention that can return extraordinary improvements.
The checklist idea originates in medicine with Dr. Peter Provonost, Johns Hopkins University critical-care researcher and MacArthur "genius" fellow. Gawande wrote a profile of Provonost, and plea for checklist implementation, in the New Yorker in Dec. 2007, and followed that article two weeks later with a New York Times op-ed piece.
The checklist idea has been borrowed from other tech-intensive fields, notably aviation. As a licensed pilot, I can testify that no pilot or crew, no matter how experienced, would ever dare take off without running through a checklist. To believe that you can keep everything you need to do in your head without reference to an external reminder is, in aviation, simply not a credible position. It is considered an absurd display of ego that puts others at unnecessary risk. (For a taste of how aviation looks at medicine's resistance to improvement, see Sir Richard Branson's comments last month.)
In the current study, one hospital in each of eight cities — Toronto, New Delhi, Amman, Auckland, Manila, London, Seattle and Ifakara, Tanzania — agreed to follow a pre-, during- and post-surgery checklist for every noncardiac surgery on patients older than 16. The study group collected data before implementation of the checklist on 3,733 consecutively enrolled patients, and during the checklist implementation, on 3,955 patients.
The checklist is on the WHO website (.pdf in English) along with toolkits for implementation. If you look, you'll see it is very simple. For instance, before anesthesia:
- Patient has confirmed: identity, site, procedure, consent
- Site marked (or marking confirmed not applicable)
- Anaesthesia safety check completed
- Pulse oximeter on patient and functioning
- Does patient have a known allergy? (No/Yes)
- Does patient have a difficult airway/aspiration risk? (No/Yes, and equipment/assistance available)
- Is there a risk of >500ml blood loss (7ml/kg in children)? (No/Yes, and adequate intravenous access and fluids planned)
Now, the research team is careful to point out the possible confounders to this study: It introduced changes in systems at the hospitals that may have created independent effects. It may suffer from the Hawthorne effect ("Observation changes the behavior of the observed.") Given that it used consecutively enrolled patients, it may be affected by secular trends at the individual institutions. And it does not track complications post-discharge.
All that being said, I think we can take this as a very potent argument for the adoption of surgical checklists as a component of campaigns to reduce medical errors. And, as Gawande says in the press release that WHO put out this afternoon, a pointer to possible improvements in other specialties as well:
These findings have implications beyond surgery, suggesting that checklists could increase the safety and reliability of care in numerous medical fields... [I]n specialties ranging from cardiac care to pediatric care, they could become as essential in daily medicine as the stethoscope.The cite on the study is: Haynes, AB, Weiser, TG, Berry, WR et al. Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population. N Eng J Med 2009: 260: 491-9. Published ahead of print Jan. 14, 2009.
UPDATE: The full text has been placed online for free.
08 December 2008
It's flu season: Watch for MRSA pneumonia.
Via the (Tucson) Arizona Daily Star, I've just caught up with the very sad story of Robert Sweitzer, a Tucson resident who died on his 39th birthday, of MRSA pneumonia.
Sweitzer died last Feb.10, but his name is in the news now because a lawsuit filed by his wife Rachel against the hospital where he died has just been scheduled for a Sept. 2009 trial.
The apparently undisputed facts of the case (according to news reports that I cannot usefully link to because they require registration) are:
We have talked before (here, here, here, here and here) about the particular danger of MRSA infection during flu season, when (it is theorized) micro-trauma to the lungs by flu infection allows MRSA to gain a foothold. Once it begins, MRSA pneumonia proceeds with incredible speed — I have spoken to parents whose children went literally from apparently healthy to dead or close to it, within 24 hours — and it is commonly mistaken either for flu or for community-acquired pneumonia, the usual drugs for which have no impact on MRSA.
So, constant readers: It is flu season. Please get a flu shot. The observations and research on this are still limited, but it does appear that if you prevent flu, MRSA will have a more difficult time gaining a foothold in the lungs. (And if you nevertheless find yourself in a situation similar to Robert Sweitzer's, and you truly believe it is life-threatening for yourself or your loved one, do whatever is necessary to direct clinical attention to you in time.)
Because I cannot link through to the Arizona Star stories, here are the dates and headlines:
Sweitzer died last Feb.10, but his name is in the news now because a lawsuit filed by his wife Rachel against the hospital where he died has just been scheduled for a Sept. 2009 trial.
The apparently undisputed facts of the case (according to news reports that I cannot usefully link to because they require registration) are:
- Sweitzer was a healthy man, married three years, who worked a full-time job and devoted all his spare hours to animal rescue.
- On Saturday, Feb. 9, he woke up feeling as though he were coming down with a cold, with a cough and low back pain. He and his wife went to a regular volunteer shift at a local cat shelter, but by evening, he was having trouble breathing. They arrived at St. Mary's Hospital ER at 6:30 p.m.
- Sweitzer was triaged within a half-hour, judged to be a low-acuity case, and sent to wait.
- It was February, the height of a bad flu season, and the ER was slammed with 170 patients.
- Sweitzer's breathing and back pain got worse and his wife twice asked unsuccessfully for him to be re-evaluated.
- When he was finally seen at 2:30 am, an X-ray showed his lungs filled up with fluid. He was put on 100% oxygen.
- He arrested twice and was pronounced dead near 7 a.m.
We have talked before (here, here, here, here and here) about the particular danger of MRSA infection during flu season, when (it is theorized) micro-trauma to the lungs by flu infection allows MRSA to gain a foothold. Once it begins, MRSA pneumonia proceeds with incredible speed — I have spoken to parents whose children went literally from apparently healthy to dead or close to it, within 24 hours — and it is commonly mistaken either for flu or for community-acquired pneumonia, the usual drugs for which have no impact on MRSA.
So, constant readers: It is flu season. Please get a flu shot. The observations and research on this are still limited, but it does appear that if you prevent flu, MRSA will have a more difficult time gaining a foothold in the lungs. (And if you nevertheless find yourself in a situation similar to Robert Sweitzer's, and you truly believe it is life-threatening for yourself or your loved one, do whatever is necessary to direct clinical attention to you in time.)
Because I cannot link through to the Arizona Star stories, here are the dates and headlines:
- 20 February 2008, "His pet projects: rescuing dogs, cats," byline Kimberly Matas
- 16 March 2008, "39-year-old's ER death leaves a lot of unanswered questions," byline Carla McClain
- 27 August 2008, "Feb. death of Tucson man, 39, tied to staph," byline Stephanie Innes
- 1 December 2008, "Suit over death at St. Mary's ER set for trial in September" (no byline).
24 November 2008
British infection control: Epic fail
Via the Guardian comes news that British hospitals are failing miserably at hygiene and infection-control targets set by the Healthcare Commission, a government-funded but independent watchdog agency somewhat analogous to the United States' Joint Commission (formerly called JCAHO).
While community-associated MRSA is still a somewhat new story in the the UK, hospital or nosocomial MRSA is a major epidemic, with resistant Clostridium difficile ("C.diff") coming close behind. So there has been significant attention paid in the UK to improving infection control programs in hospitals, through the vehicle of benchmarks set for the National Health Service trusts (essentially, regional organizational groupings of hospitals).
And the results, according to unannounced spot-checks made by the UK commission, are appalling. Only 5 of 51 trusts ( 51 = 30% of all acute-care hospitals in the UK) that were checked hit the mark. For those slow at math, that means 3% of UK hospitals are doing what they should to protect patients from infections they cause. (UPDATE: To be fair, if we assume the "5 out of 51" holds true across the NHS, then 10% are doing what they should. That's still appalling.)
For infection-control geeks, the full text of the "hygiene code" which the hospitals must abide by is here. Details of inspections at individual trusts are here.
While community-associated MRSA is still a somewhat new story in the the UK, hospital or nosocomial MRSA is a major epidemic, with resistant Clostridium difficile ("C.diff") coming close behind. So there has been significant attention paid in the UK to improving infection control programs in hospitals, through the vehicle of benchmarks set for the National Health Service trusts (essentially, regional organizational groupings of hospitals).
And the results, according to unannounced spot-checks made by the UK commission, are appalling. Only 5 of 51 trusts ( 51 = 30% of all acute-care hospitals in the UK) that were checked hit the mark. For those slow at math, that means 3% of UK hospitals are doing what they should to protect patients from infections they cause. (UPDATE: To be fair, if we assume the "5 out of 51" holds true across the NHS, then 10% are doing what they should. That's still appalling.)
"At nearly all trusts we have found gaps that need closing," said Anna Walker, the commission's chief executive. "It is important to be clear that at these trusts we are not talking about the most serious kind of breaches. But these are important warning signs to trust boards that there may be a weakness in their systems." (Byline: Sarah Boseley)How weak? This weak, according to the commission's own report:
- 27 of the 51 trusts inspected were failing to keep all areas of their premises clean and well maintained. These lapses covered issues ranging from basic cleanliness, to clutter which makes cleaning difficult, to poorly maintained hospital interiors.
- One in five trusts in this sample did not comply with all requirements for the decontamination of instruments and other equipment used in the care of patients. Trusts that breached this duty tended to have no clear strategy for decontamination or to lack an effective process to assure compliance.
- In one in eight trusts, the provision of isolation facilities was not adequate. The containment of infections is extremely important to managing outbreaks. Hospitals without adequate facilities must ensure they have contingency plans so that the risk of infections spreading between patients is minimised.
- For over one in five trusts there were issues related to staff training, information and supervision. While training on preventing and controlling infection was often in place, boards could not always ensure that training days were well attended or that staff used their knowledge in practice.
For infection-control geeks, the full text of the "hygiene code" which the hospitals must abide by is here. Details of inspections at individual trusts are here.
16 November 2008
New newspaper series on HA-MRSA
The Seattle Times this morning launched an three-day investigative project on incidence of HA-MRSA in Washington State that is worth reading.
As readers here already know, MRSA is not a reportable disease, and there are no diagnosis codes that directly correspond to MSRA that make infection or death easily trackable through hospital records or death certificates. The Times' team came up with some innovative data-drilling techniques and apparently did a massive amount of number-crunching to come up with the incidence estimates that underpin their reporting. They use those to challenge hospitals' reluctance to undertake surveillance and treatment that would wipe out MRSA on colonized patients and thus reduce the likelihood of MRSA infecting those patients or spreading to others via healthcare workers who neglect infection control. (NB, Michael Berens, the series' co-author, did a huge project on nosocomial infections when he was at the Chicago Tribune a number of years ago.)
I am puzzled by one thing I am seeing on the story's web page — one of the items in the break-out box that sums the story up very quickly to attract eyeballs to it. It says: "About 85 percent of people infected with MRSA get the germ at a hospital or other health-care facility. " That figure doesn't make sense to me; it sounds as though it is a mis-translation of the CDC finding a year ago (in the Klevens JAMA paper) that approximately 85% of invasive cases of MRSA have hospital-associated risk factors. Constant readers will remember that estimate has been challenged by researchers on community MRSA, who believe that CA-MRSA accounts for a much larger proportion of the current epidemic than has been acknowledged, and think that the wide spread of the community strain is the actual driver of the overall epidemic. I can't see where in the text the Times team has done the math to support that assertion, so if anyone else spots it, or knows the reference it comes from, please let me know.
As readers here already know, MRSA is not a reportable disease, and there are no diagnosis codes that directly correspond to MSRA that make infection or death easily trackable through hospital records or death certificates. The Times' team came up with some innovative data-drilling techniques and apparently did a massive amount of number-crunching to come up with the incidence estimates that underpin their reporting. They use those to challenge hospitals' reluctance to undertake surveillance and treatment that would wipe out MRSA on colonized patients and thus reduce the likelihood of MRSA infecting those patients or spreading to others via healthcare workers who neglect infection control. (NB, Michael Berens, the series' co-author, did a huge project on nosocomial infections when he was at the Chicago Tribune a number of years ago.)
I am puzzled by one thing I am seeing on the story's web page — one of the items in the break-out box that sums the story up very quickly to attract eyeballs to it. It says: "About 85 percent of people infected with MRSA get the germ at a hospital or other health-care facility. " That figure doesn't make sense to me; it sounds as though it is a mis-translation of the CDC finding a year ago (in the Klevens JAMA paper) that approximately 85% of invasive cases of MRSA have hospital-associated risk factors. Constant readers will remember that estimate has been challenged by researchers on community MRSA, who believe that CA-MRSA accounts for a much larger proportion of the current epidemic than has been acknowledged, and think that the wide spread of the community strain is the actual driver of the overall epidemic. I can't see where in the text the Times team has done the math to support that assertion, so if anyone else spots it, or knows the reference it comes from, please let me know.
23 October 2008
Much new news on hospital-acquired infections
There's a ton of new, and conflicting, findings on prevention and detection of hospital-acquired MRSA and other infections.
First: Today, in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, three researchers from Virginia Commonwealth University add to the ferocious debate on "search and destroy," the colloquial name for active surveillance and testing: that is, checking admitted patients for MRSA, isolating them until you have a result, and and if they are positive, treating them while continuing to isolate them until they are clear. "Search and destroy" has kept in-hospital MRSA rates very low in Europe, and has proven successful in some hospitals in the United States; in addition, four states (Pennsylvania, Illinois, California and New Jersey) have mandated it for some admitted patients at least. Nevertheless, it remains a controversial tactic, with a variety of arguments levelled against it, many of them based on cost-benefit.
Comes now Richard P. Wenzel, M.D., Gonzalo Bearman, M.D., and Michael B. Edmond, M.D., of the VCU School of Medicine, to say that the moment for MRSA search and destroy has already passed, because hospitals are now dealing with so many highly resistant bugs (Acinetobacter, vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and so on). They contend that hospitals would do better to pour resources into aggressive infection-control programs that broadly target a spectrum of HAIs.
The abstract is here and the cite is: Richard P. Wenzel, MD, MSc; Gonzalo Bearman, MD, MPH; Michael B. Edmond, MD, MPH, MPA. Screening for MRSA: A Flawed Hospital Infection Control Intervention. Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology 2008 29:11, 1012-1018.
Meanwhile, the US Government Accountability Office recently released a substantive examination of HAI surveillance and response programs, in states and in hospitals, that looks at:
I am stillworking my way through the new Compendium of Strategies to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections in Acute Care Hospitals, released a week ago by a slew of health agencies (Joint Commission, CDC, et al.) and health organizations (American Hospital Association, ACIP, SHEA, IDSA et al.), to see how much the MRSA strategies have actually changed. If anyone has any comments, please weigh in!
First: Today, in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, three researchers from Virginia Commonwealth University add to the ferocious debate on "search and destroy," the colloquial name for active surveillance and testing: that is, checking admitted patients for MRSA, isolating them until you have a result, and and if they are positive, treating them while continuing to isolate them until they are clear. "Search and destroy" has kept in-hospital MRSA rates very low in Europe, and has proven successful in some hospitals in the United States; in addition, four states (Pennsylvania, Illinois, California and New Jersey) have mandated it for some admitted patients at least. Nevertheless, it remains a controversial tactic, with a variety of arguments levelled against it, many of them based on cost-benefit.
Comes now Richard P. Wenzel, M.D., Gonzalo Bearman, M.D., and Michael B. Edmond, M.D., of the VCU School of Medicine, to say that the moment for MRSA search and destroy has already passed, because hospitals are now dealing with so many highly resistant bugs (Acinetobacter, vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and so on). They contend that hospitals would do better to pour resources into aggressive infection-control programs that broadly target a spectrum of HAIs.
The abstract is here and the cite is: Richard P. Wenzel, MD, MSc; Gonzalo Bearman, MD, MPH; Michael B. Edmond, MD, MPH, MPA. Screening for MRSA: A Flawed Hospital Infection Control Intervention. Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology 2008 29:11, 1012-1018.
Meanwhile, the US Government Accountability Office recently released a substantive examination of HAI surveillance and response programs, in states and in hospitals, that looks at:
- the design and implementation of state HAI public reporting systems,
- the initiatives hospitals have undertaken to reduce MRSA infections, and
- the experience of certain early-adopting hospitals in overcoming challenges to implement such initiatives. (from the cover letter)
- No two places are doing this the same way — which means that data still does not match state to state
- Experts are still divided about how much MRSA control is necessary
- Hospitals that have undertaken MRSA-reduction programs have taken different paths
- But MRSA control does work: It does reduce in-hospital infections, but at a cost.
I am stillworking my way through the new Compendium of Strategies to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections in Acute Care Hospitals, released a week ago by a slew of health agencies (Joint Commission, CDC, et al.) and health organizations (American Hospital Association, ACIP, SHEA, IDSA et al.), to see how much the MRSA strategies have actually changed. If anyone has any comments, please weigh in!
05 October 2008
UK: Hospitals' MRSA deaths could bring manslaughter charges
Last Wednesday was the first day of the new federal fiscal year, and therefore the day on which HHS's new "non-reimbursement for medical errors" rule went into effect. Under this new rule (blogged here and here and covered in this New York Times story), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services will no longer reimburse hospitals for the increased care that a patient needs after an extreme medical error has happened. While infecting a patient with MRSA is not specifically disavowed in the rule, it outlaws reimbursement as of this year for infections associated with vascular catheters and coronary artery bypass graft surgery, and next year (Oct. 1, 2009) for surgical site infections following orthopedic procedures. (Disappointingly, CMS rejected requests to define staph septicemia and nosocomial MRSA infection as "never events.")
Now, however, it seems that the UK government is willing to go much further than our own. According to a story in The Independent (first flagged here by ace flu blogger Crawford Killian), "tough new manslaughter laws" will allow corporations — including healthcare institutions — to be held accountable for deaths in which corporate behavior plays a role:
So far, US protests and citizen action over nosocomial MRSA infections have been within individual states (see this recent post on the new Nile's Law in California). But isn't it interesting to see what coordinated national action — granted, in a smaller country — can do.
Now, however, it seems that the UK government is willing to go much further than our own. According to a story in The Independent (first flagged here by ace flu blogger Crawford Killian), "tough new manslaughter laws" will allow corporations — including healthcare institutions — to be held accountable for deaths in which corporate behavior plays a role:
Maria Eagle, the Justice minister, told a meeting of more than 100 chairs and non-executive directors of NHS trusts that where managers ignore warnings of health risks, prosecutions may follow. She said: "Putting the offence into context, imagine that a patient has died in a hospital infected by MRSA and the issue of corporate manslaughter has been raised. Could the organisation be prosecuted and convicted? The answer is 'possibly'. (Byline: Robert Verkaik, law editor)Public attitudes in the UK are ripe for this change. In July, there was significant protest after it emerged — via a government report — that 345 patients died of Clostridium difficile infection at three hospitals, after government warnings, with no punishment to the hospitals. In fact, according to The Independent, the chief executive of the trust that operated all three was allowed to resign with $150,000 in foregone pay, and is now suing for additional compensation.
So far, US protests and citizen action over nosocomial MRSA infections have been within individual states (see this recent post on the new Nile's Law in California). But isn't it interesting to see what coordinated national action — granted, in a smaller country — can do.
05 September 2008
Emergency medicine in crisis (important for MRSA also)
Constant readers may remember that, before I began this MRSA project, I spent a year as a media fellow with the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, researching overcrowding and stress in emergency rooms. (Some stories from that project here, here and here.)
So I was particularly interested in and saddened by a post on the excellent blog Health Beat (now in the blogroll!) that explores in good detail why emergency rooms are so crowded and especially what the loss of experienced emergency nurses is doing to the quality of emergency care.
Why is this important for MRSA? Well, if you or a family member is struck with what looks like one of the dramatic presentations of MRSA — bone infection, rapidly progressing pneumonia, even a serious skin infection — where are you likely to take that problem? Yes, to the ER. Even if you have insurance; an increasing number of studies are pointing out that the vast majority of people waiting for care are not the uninsured or undocumented, but insured people who can't get care from their regular doctors.
So be prepared.
So I was particularly interested in and saddened by a post on the excellent blog Health Beat (now in the blogroll!) that explores in good detail why emergency rooms are so crowded and especially what the loss of experienced emergency nurses is doing to the quality of emergency care.
Why is this important for MRSA? Well, if you or a family member is struck with what looks like one of the dramatic presentations of MRSA — bone infection, rapidly progressing pneumonia, even a serious skin infection — where are you likely to take that problem? Yes, to the ER. Even if you have insurance; an increasing number of studies are pointing out that the vast majority of people waiting for care are not the uninsured or undocumented, but insured people who can't get care from their regular doctors.
So be prepared.
22 August 2008
Not-reimbursing hospitals for MRSA: The reaction
You'll remember that early in the summer we talked about the proposal by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services to cease reimbursing hospitals for the additional care of a patient that is required when a hospital gives a patient a nosocomial infection. CMS has been debating whether to include several types of hospital-acquired infection in the 2009 iteration of its "never event" no-reimbursement list. (CMS has not announced its final choices.)
Healthcare's reaction has been, hmmm, not positive. At The New Health Dialogue, Joanne Kenen captures the reactions, many of which run along the lines of "infections are inevitable because patients are so sick." But she's also found a marvelous (and appalling?) argument that goes, more or less, "Preventing infections will be more costly, not less, because hospitals will introduce additional procedures to protect themselves."
This recalls the intriguing and dismaying suggestion in JAMA a few weeks ago that "search and destroy" active surveillance is driven less by wanting to halt in-hospital transmission and more by hospitals wanting to build a case that patients brought the infection with them.
Healthcare's reaction has been, hmmm, not positive. At The New Health Dialogue, Joanne Kenen captures the reactions, many of which run along the lines of "infections are inevitable because patients are so sick." But she's also found a marvelous (and appalling?) argument that goes, more or less, "Preventing infections will be more costly, not less, because hospitals will introduce additional procedures to protect themselves."
This recalls the intriguing and dismaying suggestion in JAMA a few weeks ago that "search and destroy" active surveillance is driven less by wanting to halt in-hospital transmission and more by hospitals wanting to build a case that patients brought the infection with them.
14 August 2008
Surveillance to stop MRSA: Where, when, how costly, how much?
My colleague Joanne Kenen — longtime health policy correspondent for Reuters, now a staff member at the New American Foundation, and a Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Media Fellow with me in 2006-07 — very kindly invited me to guest-blog at the New Health Dialogue. Most of the post is reproduced below, but please be kind and visit them so they can record the hits!
Stopping the spread of MRSA in hospitals is one of the most contentious topics in infectious disease policy right now. A small sample of the, umm, highly divergent views on the subject filled up the letters pages of the Journal of the American Medical Association last week. Community-associated MRSA has grabbed the public's attention over the past year, but hospital-acquired MRSA remains a huge problem — so much so that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has proposed treating it as a medical error and declining to reimburse hospitals for the extra care that must be given to a patient when it occurs.
Within health care, there is vociferous debate over how to control MRSA. Because MRSA can live on the skin, nostrils and other body sites for a long period of time before causing an infection — either in the person colonized by the bug or in someone else who acquired it from the colonized person — many hospitals espouse a program of checking new patients who are most likely to be carriers, including patients in high-risk units such as ICUs, new admits from long-term care facilities, and people who have had MRSA infections on the past. But a small set of institutions are pursuing a more aggressive program, variously called "active surveillance and testing," "universal screening" or "search and destroy," that checks every inpatient for MRSA colonization and confines them to isolation until the bug has cleared.
"Search and destroy" was the topic of an important JAMA paper and editorial last March that decided the effort wasn't worthwhile. (A simultaneously published paper in the Annals of Internal Medicine completely disagreed.) The five letters in JAMA tear the topic apart, examining definitions, methodology, cost-effectiveness, adherence to infection control and more. The most intriguing suggests that "search and destroy" contains a hidden agenda: That if hospitals can demonstrate patients were carrying MRSA on admission, they may be able to make a case for any subsequent infections not being their fault — and so escape the lowered reimbursement rates that CMS proposes.
Stopping the spread of MRSA in hospitals is one of the most contentious topics in infectious disease policy right now. A small sample of the, umm, highly divergent views on the subject filled up the letters pages of the Journal of the American Medical Association last week. Community-associated MRSA has grabbed the public's attention over the past year, but hospital-acquired MRSA remains a huge problem — so much so that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has proposed treating it as a medical error and declining to reimburse hospitals for the extra care that must be given to a patient when it occurs.
Within health care, there is vociferous debate over how to control MRSA. Because MRSA can live on the skin, nostrils and other body sites for a long period of time before causing an infection — either in the person colonized by the bug or in someone else who acquired it from the colonized person — many hospitals espouse a program of checking new patients who are most likely to be carriers, including patients in high-risk units such as ICUs, new admits from long-term care facilities, and people who have had MRSA infections on the past. But a small set of institutions are pursuing a more aggressive program, variously called "active surveillance and testing," "universal screening" or "search and destroy," that checks every inpatient for MRSA colonization and confines them to isolation until the bug has cleared.
"Search and destroy" was the topic of an important JAMA paper and editorial last March that decided the effort wasn't worthwhile. (A simultaneously published paper in the Annals of Internal Medicine completely disagreed.) The five letters in JAMA tear the topic apart, examining definitions, methodology, cost-effectiveness, adherence to infection control and more. The most intriguing suggests that "search and destroy" contains a hidden agenda: That if hospitals can demonstrate patients were carrying MRSA on admission, they may be able to make a case for any subsequent infections not being their fault — and so escape the lowered reimbursement rates that CMS proposes.
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